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WRONG PLACE, WRONG TIME, UNFAIR
TREATMENT? AID TO VICTIMS OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS

Deborah M. Mostaghel*

I. INTRODUCTION

Aid to terrorism victims has, until recently, been a secondary aspect of
American laws dealing with acts of terrorism. The earliest American laws
dealing with terrorism, passed in response to terrorism directed at American
facilities abroad, focused primarily on preventing such acts from happening
again. Victims of early attacks received little or no aid targeted to them as
victims of terrorism. As terrorist attacks have increased, lawmakers have
incorporated more generous and more diverse kinds ofaid for victims or their
survivors. In fact, helping victims and their families in the aftermath of a
terrorist event has been one of the goals of recent terrorism legislation.
Recent federal laws recognize that survivors and their families are likely to
need various levels of medical care, psychological counseling, and financial
assistance.
While the trend in our terrorism response laws is to recognize that victims
ofterrorism need special assistance, victims who suffer similar hanns may still
be treated differently under our laws. This different treatment of victims
springs from two causes. First, Congress passes terrorism legislation in
response to individual episodes of terrorism. Lawmakers working to pass
legislation in the emotional aftermath of a terrorist event are not necessarily
concerned with how, or even whether, these laws coordinate with other similar
laws. Second, while laws providing aid to victims may appear to be similar,
two quite different rationales underlie our terrorist response laws. These two
different rationales for providing aid lead to differences in the kind ofaid that
is available and who is eligible for it. As terrorism becomes more prevalent

• Director ofLegal Research and Writing, The University of Toledo College of Law; J.D.,
The University of Utah College of Law 1988. Wrong Time. Wrong Place. Unfair Treatment?
Aid to Victims o/Terrorist Attacks was written before the tragic events of September II, 2001.
To the memory of all the victims of that terrible day, this article is dedicated.
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against American targets both outside and within the United States, we must
be aware that the laws we pass to help victims may actually treat similarly
situated victims in unfairly disparate ways. We should strive to make our laws
providing aid to terrorism victims congruent to ensure that the goal ofhelping
victims is fairly met
Part II of this Article discusses why it is appropriate to provide aid to
victims ofterrorism. Part III discusses the rationales that underlie federal laws
intended to aid terrorism victims. Part IV gives a brief overview ofterrorism
legislation and classifies the major federal laws under the two rationales
explained in Part III. Part V presents an argument that we can best fulfill our
responsibility to those who are hurt as a result of a terrorist attack against
American targets by adopting a definition of victim that is broader than the
traditional definition based on citizenship. Adopting a broad defmition ofvictim
ensures that similarly harmed victims receive similar aid. Defining victims
broadly recognizes the trend away from focusing on a narrow group ofvictims
in a narrow set of circumstances and toward aiding a wider group of people
in broader circumstances. Broadly defining victims I creates more flexibility
and more consistency in our terrorism response laws, so that these laws can
help the greatest number of injured victims. Part VI presents a proposed
definition of victim for incorporation into existing and new legislation.
II. PROVIDING FEDERAL AID TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM
Terrorism, both at home and abroad, has become a fact of modem life.
The appellate court in the case of Pan Am Flight 103, which was blown up
over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, tookjudicial notice ofthe rise in international
terrorism. The court detailed specific attempts to sabotage air flights occurring
in 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. 2 While many terrorist acts are a "threat from
outside,"3 others represent a "threat from within."4 Terrorist acts within the
United States vary from assaults on individuals to the bombing of massive

I See proposed definition infra at Part VI. I argue that victims must be defined more
broadly than "citizen" and even more broadly than "resident" to encompass all who owe loyalty
to the United States or for whom the United States has responsibility.
2 See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988 v. Pan American World
Airways, 37 F.3d 804, 819-20 (2d Cir. 1994).
) HARVEY W. KUSHNER, TERRORISM IN AMERICA 11 (1998).
4 Id. at 56. Kushner discusses various antigovernment extremists, some of whom belong
to organized groups and some of whom are freelancers. See id. at 56-85.
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targets such as the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993. Official
concern about terrorism is clear. In 1997, Congress approved a domestic
preparedness plan to train local emergency service agencies to deal with
potential terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction.s In 1999, the
National League of Cities published a guidebook for local officials to use in
planning for and responding to terrorist attacks.6 Whenever an act ofterrorism
involves Americans, the President and Congress react with proclamations,
directives, and legislation. The legislation passed in response to terrorist events
also includes aid for victims.
Including aid for victims is entirely proper. Terrorists generally espouse
"some ideological, religious, or political cause,'l1 so terrorist acts are generally
targeted toward specific groups, which may be ethnic, religious, or national.
Although individuals are injured and killed, their individuality is incidental to
their membership in the target group. Terrorist acts are generally designed
''to compel governments into making concessions."8 Paradoxically, as the
government tries to prevent terrorism by hardening targets such as airports and
embassies, terrorism is deflected to softer targets. "Rather than give up
entirely, terrorist groups simply move to a target that is easier. For terrorist
groups, the range of acceptable targets is determined by ideology, but the
choice of a specific target within that range is a matter of convenience or
opportunity."9 Thus, one result of combating terrorism may well be to create
even more victims. Since it is government that is the ultimate target, it is
appropriate for government to provide aid for the victims. Early legislation that
provided compensation to hostages and their families was based on the
"principle that the government as a reasonable and compassionate employer
had a responsibility to ... hostages to provide ... some material relief to
partially offset the duress suffered by them and their families."lo

See John K. Wiley, Training Focuses on Domestic Terrorism: Police. Firefighters and
Paramedics in Spokane Learn How to Deal with Various Weapons, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
May 9, 2000, at D02.
6 See NLC Book Gives Practical Advice/or Dealing with Terrorism, 23 NATION'S CITIES
WKLY., May 15,2000, at 13 (reviewing DoMESTIC TERRORISM: RESOURCES FOR LOcAL
GOVERNMENT (pub. #3545».
7 Roberta Smith, Note, America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: The United States
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 0/1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law and
International Response,S CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMPo L. 249, 249-50 (1997).
I Martha Crenshaw, Unintended Consequences: How Democracies Respond to Terrorism,
21 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 153, 154 (1997).
9 Id. at 158.
10 Kimberly A. Trotter, Note, Compensating Victims o/Terrorism, 22 TEXAS INT'L L.J.
5
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Further, as Congress struggles to find ways to prevent terrorist attacks,
reduce their force, and help in recovery efforts afterwards, it is appropriate to
help individual victims as well as the devastated community. Because massive
attacks such as the World Trade Center bombing 11 or the Oklahoma Federal
Building bombing l2 exact huge economic and psychological tolls on the
community and on the nation, the federal government provides billions of
dollars in aid at the community and state level. 13 The economic and
psychological toll is equally devastating to individual victims, and it is equally
necessary to provide aid at this level. In establishing a memorial to be built in
Oklahoma City, Congress found that the "losses and struggles" ofthe survivors
were not only personal; "since they resulted from so public an attack, they are
also shared with a community, a Nation, and the world."14 Similarly, aid to
victims not only helps particular victims get back on their feet; it reassures all
who belong to the community that they will not be abandoned should they
themselves become victims.
III.

RATIONALES UNDERLYING FEDERAL LAWS INTENDED TO AID
VICTIMS OF TERRORISM

The major provisions in current federal law that respond to the needs of
terrorist victims fall into two categories: compensation and restitution. Aid to
383, 386 n. J 9 (J 987) (quoting Statement of Norman Painter, President, American Federation
ofGovemment Employees, p. 43 ofH.R. 1956 and H.R. 2019, Benefits to Federal Employees
Who are Victims of Terrorism: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Civil Service and the
Subcomm. On Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Comm. On Post Office and
Civil Service and the Subcomm. On Int'I Operations of the House Comm. On Foreign Affairs,
99th Cong.• 1st Sess. 43 (1985».
II The World Trade Center in New York City was bombed in February, 1993. The truck
bomb explosion killed six people and injured at least a thousand others. The economic damage
was estimated to be over $510 million. See Daniel Wise, Lawyers Pack World Trade Center
Hearing, N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1994, at I.
12 The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was bombed on April 19, 1995.
The preliminary damage estimate was $652 million. See Paul English, Preliminary Estimate Puts
Bomb Losses at $652 Million: Uncovered Costs to Stagger State Budget Resources, 1lIE DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, May 19, 1995, at I.
13 For example, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 authorizes
grants to states to provide assistance to victims of terrorism through the states' crime victim
compensation and assistance programs. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (I \0 Stat.) 1214-1319 (J996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
14 16 U.S.C. § 450ss(4) (Supp. V 1999).
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terrorism victims is an extension of aid that has been given to victims of other
crimes. Aid for traditional crime victims is not new. IS At the state level,
California codified a right to restitution for crime victims in 1965. 16 At the
federal level, Congress codified such a right in the early 1980s. 17 By 1992, all
the states had passed laws to aid victims of crime. 18 While these statutes that
provide aid for crime victims seem to be interchangeably characterized as
victim restitution or victim compensation laws, restitution- and
compensation-type statutes provide aid in different ways. Generally,
compensation-type statutes give financial or other aid to victims or their
survivors. Restitution-type statutes enable victims or their survivors to seek
restitution directly from the perpetrator. American federal law to aid victims
of terrorism follows these two patterns.

A. Compensation Statutes-Protecting Victims
Under compensation-type laws, the government collects fines from
various categories ofcriminal wrongdoers and then uses money from the fmes
to provide aid to victims. Victims' compensation statutes were first passed in
New Zealand and Great Britain, influenced by penal reformer Margaret Fry
in the late 1950s. 19 American states followed suit, and by 1992, all the states
had passed laws to aid victims of crime. 20 These laws grew out of a
"humanitarian and 'liberal ,,, 21 rights theory positing that a state that fails ''to
protect its citizens from crime is obligated to provide compensation to those
who become victims. "22 The rights theory can be based in tort or contract.

IS See Robert C. Davis et a1., Restitution: The Victim's Viewpoint, IS JUST. SYS. J. 746, 747
(\ 992); see also David L. Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer the
"Forgotten Victim," 17 PEPP. L. REv. 35 (1989).
16 See lames Culhane, Note, California Enacts Legislation to Aid Victims of Criminal
Violence, 18 STAN. L. REv. 266,266 (\965).
17 See 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Victim and Witness Protection
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (ordering restitution to victims); 18 U.S.C. §
3663A (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (discussing mandatory restitution to victims of certain crimes).
Legislative history for § 3663 is found in the legislative history to the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 925.
18 See Desmond S. Greer, A Transatlantic Perspective on the Compensation of Crime
Victims in the United States, 85 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 333, 334 (1994).
19 See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim 's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1985).
20 See Greer, supra note 18, at 334.
21 Henderson, supra note 19, at 944.
22 Charlene L. Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard Questions and Suggested Remedies, 17
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In the tort scenario, ifthe State breaches its duty to protect citizens, the injured
citizens would have actions against the State for damages in tort. 23 Under the
contract theory, citizens have actions for breach of contract if society fails to
protect them because they have given up the individual right to exact
retribution from a wrongdoer in return for society's protection. 24
B. Restitution Statutes-Empowering Victims

In schemes that include state compensation of victims, the goals of
criminal punishment are deterrence and rehabilitation.25 However, as support
for liberal approaches to crime control declined during the '70s and '80S,26
deterrence and rehabilitation became less important as goals of punishment.
Conservatives argued that "retribution and incapacitation [were] the only
tenable justifications for punishment of criminals."27
The emphasis on retribution leads to a second type ofvictim-centered law,
laws that provide restitution. Under restitution statutes, the wrongdoer makes
restitution by directly paying the victim for the harm he has suffered.28 As part
of the debate surrounding passage of the Victim and Witness Protection Act
in 1982,29 the Committee on the Judiciary pointed out that
[t]he principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every fonnal system
of criminal justice, of every culture and every time. It holds that, whatever
else the sanctioning power of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it
should also insure that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to
restore the victim to his or her prior state ofwell-being.30

Restitution schemes rest generally on this tort principle that the wrongdoer
should "restore" the victim to his or her status quo ante. 31
Critics ofcrime victims' restitution statutes point out that grafting the tort

RUTGERS
23

24

2.!
26

27

21
29

30
31

L.1. 51,62 (1985).

See id.
See id. at 63.
See Henderson, supra note 19, at 945.
See id.
Id. at 947.
See Smith, supra note 22, at 57.
18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.2536.
See Henderson, supra note 19, at 1007.
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concept of making the victim whole onto the criminal law results in a hybrid
that elevates the victim's individual concerns above society's concerns. This
elevation of the victim's concerns occurs more with restitution statutes than
with compensation statutes. That is because compensation statutes are
premised on the government's duty to protect the citizen. When that duty is
breached under compensation statutes, the government reimburses the victim,
while the criminal remains subjectto all the sanctions ofthe criminal law. With
restitution statutes, however, the premise is that the government is not liable for
the breach. Only the criminal is liable, and it is the criminal's duty to make the
victim whole. Thus, sentencing under a restitution statute may focus on
requiring the criminal to pay a fine, without regard for the other purposes of
sentencing. 32 Critics argue that a society protects its rightto exist by imposing
criminal sanctions in response to crime,33 rather than allowing private
settlements between victim and wrongdoer. Ordering restitution for victims
requires that criminal sentencing focus on enabling the victim to obtain
compensation from the criminal. Thus, the victim's right to recover becomes
the primary goal, to the exclusion of other sentencing goals such as
punishment, retribution, or incapacitation. 34
Advocates of restitution point out that giving primacy to the victim's right
to recover helps victims even if their financial recovery from the perpetrator
is slight. These advocates stress another rationale for restitution, the concept
that victims recover more readily from the trauma of the event if they have
some say in how the aftermath is handled. Some victims in a restitution
system ask for no more than to confront the perpetrator and force him or her
to view the result of the criminal event. Advocates of restitution argue that
crime victims who must wait until criminal sentencing occurs and then sue in
tort and in civil court never have this opportunity to confront their attackers and
to bring the episode to closure. Forcing a crime victim to pursue a civil remedy
after undergoing the ordeal ofa criminal trial is "unnecessarily burdensome and
duplicative."3s Adding insult to injury, these victims are very often unable to
recover financial damages anyway, when the perpetrators are indigent or
otherwise judgment-proof. 36

For example, restitution has been used as a condition of probation. See Alan T. Harland,
Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30
UCLA L. REV. 52, 65 (1982).
33 See Henderson, supra note 19, at 1009.
34 See id. at 1007-08.
3' Id. at 1007 n.312.
36 See id at 942 n.25.
32
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OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL TERRORISM LEGISLATION

A. Compensation-Type Statutes
Terrorism legislation in the United States initially developed in response to
acts of terrorism against Americans and American facilities abroad. 3? One
goal of these laws was to provide financial compensation to victims or their
survivors. Victims under these early statutes were generally assumed to be
United States citizens working directly for the United States government. 38

1. Hostage ReliefAct of 1980
As part of the treaty under which the hostages taken captive in Iran were
released, the United States agreed that the hostages would not sue Iran.39
Congress enacted the Hostage Relief Act of 1980 as an alternate means of aid
to the captives.40 The Hostage Relief Act restricted victims to those working
for the American government at the time of their captivity. It recognized that
family members are compensable victims. 41 It did not recognize as a
compensable victim the only hostage who was not working for the American
government at the time of the hostage taking. Congress made "a clear
distinction between the private American hostage and public official hostages
... by providing only ... tax relief benefits ... to the private citizen while
making the government employees eligible for the other benefits .... ''42 The

37 See Hostage Relief Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-449 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
5561 (1994 & Supp. V 1999»; see also Pub. L. No. 99-399, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1870-71
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331- 2339B (1994 & Supp. V 1999» (Background and
Committee Comment, discussing Omnibus Diplomatic Security & Antiterrorism Act of 1986).
31 See H.R. REp. NO. 99-494, at4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1870 ("our
people and our embassies," Background and Committee Comment).
39 Briefly, the prohibitions against hostages suing Iran were signed by President Jimmy
Carter on Jan. 19,1982 in Exec. Order No. 12,283,3 C.F.R. 114-15 (1982), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 1701,note(1994)(Non-ProsecutionofClaims), and President Ronald Regan, who took
office on Jan. 20, 1981, implemented the prohibitions by signing Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3
C.F.R. 139-40 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, note (1994) (Suspension of Litigation
Against Iran). See generally, Trotter, supra note 10, at 387.
40 See Hostage Relief Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-449 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
5561, note (1994 & Supp. V 1999»; see a/so Trotter, supra note 10, at 388.
41 See 5 U.S.C. § 5569 (1994).
42 Trotter, supra note 10, at 388 n.33 (quoting President's Commission on Hostage
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other benefits included: an interest-bearing salary savings fund;43
reimbursement for the hostages and their families for medical expenses
attributable to the hostage experience;44 extension ofthe Soldiers and Sailors
Relief Act to hostages;45 exemption from gross income of compensation paid
while a hostage~6 exclusion ofcompensation from income tax ifthe employee
died as a result of hostile action~7 deferral of taxes and penalties;48
authorization of spouse to file joint retum;49 and reimbursement of postsecondary educational or retraining expenses. 50
The Act did not provide monetary compensation directly to the victims or
their families. On the same day that President Jimmy Carter signed the treaty
providing for the release of the hostages,51 he signed an executive order
creating the President's Commission on Hostage Compensation. 52 The
purpose of the Commission was to recommend "whether the United States
should provide financial compensation to the United States nationals held
hostage in Iran ...."53 The Commission recommended not to pay tort-type
compensation to the hostages. Instead, the Commission considered that
monetary damages such as those paid to prisoners of war would be more
appropriate.$4 The amount ultimately recommended as per diem compensation
for 444 days in captivity was $12.50. 55

Compensation. The Final Report and Recommendations of the President's Commission on
Hostage Compensation, at 32 (Sept. 21, 1981)(unpublished report».
43 See 5 U.S.C. § 5569(b) (1994) .
.... See id § 5569(c).
4' See id § 5569(e)(I).
46 See Hostage Relief Act § 20 I.
47 See id § 202.
41 See 5 U.S.C. § 5568 (1994).
49 See Hostage Relief Act § 203.
'0 See 5 U.S.C. § 5569(t) (1994).
51 See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
Jan. 19, 1981, United States-Iran, 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981). For discussion, see Trotter, supra note
10, at 387 n.24 and accompanying text.
'2 See Exec. Order No. 12,285,3 C.F.R. 117-18 (I 982); see also Trotter, supra note 10, at
389 n.38.
'3 Trotter, supra note 10, at 389 n.39.
54 See id. at 390.
" See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. The amount now authorized is "not less
than one-half of the amount of the average per diem rate ... in effect for each day" that the
captive was held. 5 U.S.C. § 5569(d)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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Congress did not implement the Commission's recommendations. s6
Instead, Congress passed new legislation building on the Hostage ReliefAct.
2. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antite"orism Act oj 1986

The Committee on Foreign Affairs became more and more concerned that
the security of American facilities abroad was "increasingly threatened by
more sophisticated terroristentities."s7 In 1984, Congress established a Staff
Task Force on International Terrorism and Diplomatic Security in response to
this increase in threats at United States embassies and consulates.sa By 1986,
violence against American installations and personnel had escalated to the
point that House Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, Jr. called for all committees
working on terrorism issues to work together to develop an omnibus bill. S9 The
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 {"Omnibus
Act")60 grew out of these efforts. As part of the Omnibus Act, Congress
passed the Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act.
3.

Victims ojTerrorism Compensation Act

The Victims ofTerrorism Compensation Act,61 a part ofthe Omnibus Act,
grew directly out ofseveral hostage situations in which consular officials were
killed, as well as out ofthe Iran hostage situation, in which fifty-two hostages
were held captive for 444 days.62 The Victims of Terrorism Compensation
Act builds on the earlier Hostage Relief Act3 but differs from it in significant
ways. In terms of similarities, it focuses on the plight of victims of terrorist
attacks, specifically victims held captive.64 The attacks are presumed to occur
against American facilities abroad. 6s The view that terrorist attacks were an

See H.R. REp. No. 99-201, pt ], at6 (1985).
H.R. REp. NO. 99-494, at 4 (1986), reprinted in ]986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, ]870.
,. See id.
'9 See id. at 6, reprinted in ]986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at ]872.
60 Pub. L. No. 99-399, reprinted in ]986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (]OO Stat.) 853-90] (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S. C.).
61 Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 80]-805, reprinted in ]986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 853,879
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
62 See H.R. REP. No. 99-494, at 5 (]986), reprinted in ]986 U.S.C.C.A.N. ]865, ]871.
63 5 U.S.C. § 5561 (1994 & Supp. V ]999).
64 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-494, at 29 (]986), reprinted in ]986 U.S.C.C.A.N.186S, ]895.
6' 18 U.S.C. § 233](1)(C) (1994).
56
$7
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international, not a domestic, problem, is clear from President Ronald Reagan's
signing statement, in which he said the Act made "yet another step forward in
our bipartisan effort to eradicate international terrorism."66 This law signals
the beginning ofa broader realization that terrorism was becoming ubiquitous
enough that it was now necessary to plan to take care of victims as well as to
prevent attacks on the buildings where they work. President Reagan was
"particularly pleased" to support the victims ofterrorism assistance program,
which "for the first time will provide for the care and welfare ofthe victims of
terrorism and their families.'>67
Like the Hostage ReliefAct, the Victims ofTerrorism Compensation Act
provides benefits to civil servants or citizens, nationals, or resident aliens ofthe
United States who are rendering personal service to the United States and who
are taken captive as a result of their relationship with the United States
government.68 Also like the Hostage Relief Act, families of captives receive
compensation in cases of disability or death. 69 Benefits include a cash
payment for each day in captivity,70 special savings accounts, 71 medical and
health care made necessary by the captivity, 72 relief provisions ofthe Soldiers
and Sailors Relief Act, 73 and educational benefits. 74
A significant difference between the Victims ofTerrorism Compensation
Act and the Hostage Relief Act is that the former allows cash payments to be
paid directly to the victims for every day oftheir captivity. Only non-monetary
compensation was available under the earlier Hostage ReliefAct. The House
Report's analysis ofthe cash payment section ofthe bill reveals a new national
recognition that victims must be compensated not only on their own behalf, but
on the nation's. According to the report,
In detennining a level of cash compensation for civilian captives, the
committee attempted to weigh the issues presented in the debate over the rate
of compensation for the Iran hostages. At the time that the President's
Commission on Hostage Compensation presented its findings, many felt that

H.R. REp. No. 99-494, at 92 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1965.
67 Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1966.
61 See 5 U.S.C. § 5569(a)(I)(8), (a)(2) (1994).
69 See id. § 5570.
70 See id. § 5569(d)(I).
7. See id. § 5569(b)(1).
n See id. § 5569(c).
73 See id. § 5569(d)(6)(e)(1).
74 See id. § 5569(d)(6)(f)(I)(A).
66
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the Commission's recommendation that the hostages receive $12.50 per day
for every day in captivity vastly underestimated both the captivity itself and
the sympathy of the American people for the captives' plight.7s

Under the new law, the cash payment was set at SSO per day for each day of
captivity between November 4, 1979 and January 21, 1981. Then the base
cash payment was to be not less than half of the amount of the world-wide
average per diem rate in effect for each day the captive is held. 76
Another significant difference between the Victims of Terrorism
Compensation Act and the older Hostage Relief Act is that the latter was
created to respond to a specific act of hostage taking. The newer law
recognizes that such events are not unique; looking beyond a specific triggering
event, it covers hostages taken in any terrorist event after the Iranian hostage
taking.

4. Policy Statements in Response to the Pan Am Flight 103
Bombing
In 1990, four years after passage of the Victims of Terrorism
Compensation Act, Congress passed new legislation to aid victims hurt or
killed in international terrorist incidents directed at American targets. 77 This
time the terrorist target was not an embassy or consulate, but an American
jetl iner bringing people home for the holidays. And for the first time, the relief
measure aided ordinary citizens, not just government workers. After Pan Am
flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988, victims'
families criticized the United States' lack of preparation to deal with such a
tragedy.78 Congress moved quickly to add a series of policy statements to
Title 22, which deals with foreign relations, intending to guide the State
Department in responding to aviation disasters or terrorist attacks. 79 These

H.R. REP. No. 99-494, at 31 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1897.
See 5 U.S.C. § 5569(d)(I) (1994).
n See Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990,22 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5513 (1994 Supp.
Y]999).
71 For discussion, see Laurie M. McQuade, Note, Tragedy as Catalyst for Reform: The
American Way?, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 325, 356-59 (1996).
79 See Aviation Security Improvement Act ofl 990, 22 U.S.C. §§ 550]-5513 (1994& Supp.
Y 1999) (United States Response to Terrorism Affecting Americans Abroad). The policy
statements include:
1. To directly and promptly notify the families of American victims of aviation
75

76
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policy statements are titled loosely "United States Response to Terrorism
Affecting Americans Abroad." The congressional fmdings underlying passage
of these policy statements stressed that the safety and security of passengers

disasters abroad. See 22 U.S.C. § 5503(a} (1994).
2. To provide a State Department liaison for the family of each citizen involved in
an aviation disaster. See id. § 5504(a}.
3.

To provide supplemental disaster training to consular officers. See id. § 5505(a).
In implementing supplemental disaster training, the Secretary of State is directed
to consult with death and bereavement specialists in planning how to deal with
aviation disasters and terrorist attacks. See id. § 5505(b)(I). The Secretary of
State should also consider "providing specialized training to create a team of
disaster specialists to deploy immediately in a crisis," id. § 5505(b)(2)(A), and
"securing outside experts to be brought in during the initial phases to assist
consular personnel." Jd. § 5505(b)(2)(B).

4. To dispatch at least one senior State Department official to the site of a disaster.
See id. § 5506(a). To create an ombudsman to help families who travel to the site
of a disaster. See id. § 5506(c). To deploy a crisis team to the site. See id. §
5506(d).
5.

To provide liaise with foreign governments to arrange to bring home remains and
personal effects. See id. § 5507.

6. To assess the Department of State response to the Flight 103 disaster as a
guideline for future Department of State responses to similar disasters. See id.
§ 5508(a}-(b).
7. To create guidelines for appropriate ceremonies to show respect and support for
families of United States citizens killed through acts ofterrorism abroad. See id.
§ 5509.
8. To ask the President to consider recommending legislation to provide monetary
and tax relief as compensation to United States citizens who are victims of
terrorism. See id. § 5510(a).
9. To establish an electronic bulletin board that ordinary citizens may access that
contains daily updated information available on the Overseas Security Electronic
Bulletin Board of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. See id. § 5511.
10. To establish antiterrorism measures that include: guidelines to help international
aviation travelers from unwittingly assisting in terrorist activities, negotiating
with other nations to establish such guidelines, notifying the public of available
rewards for information on international terrorist-related activities. See id. §
55 I 2(a}-(c)(1 994 & Supp. V 1999).
II. To propose the establishment of a comprehensive aviation security program.
See id. § 5513.
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on United States air carriers should receive the highest priority, that aviation
security systems in place at the time were inadequate to do that, and that the
United States, alone and with other nations, should immediately take steps to
improve international safety.so The policy statements include sending disaster
specialists and crisis teams to the site, providing an ombudsman to help
bereaved families who travel to the area, liaising with foreign governments to
arrange to bring home bodies and personal effects, and creating guidelines for
appropriate ceremonies. The attention to victims' and families' needs is a new
step in terrorist legislation for victims who are not employees of the
government.
5. Antite"orism and Effective Death Penalty Act

The policy statements mentioned above were drafted in response to an act
of terrorism occurring abroad. Although Congress had been considering
several crime bills that contained provisions dealing with terrorism, the bombing
ofthe Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, killing 168
people, was the catalyst for legislation responding to terrorism at home. After
the bombing, these bills were modified specifically to respond to that event. 8J
The new laws are found in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("Antiterrorism Act"}.82 Those portions dealing with victims are codified in
Title 42, Public Health and Welfare,83 and are intended to coordinate with the
earlier Omnibus Act. Passage of these new laws shows Congress'
recognition that terrorism occurs within the United States.84 Supplemental
grants to state crime victim compensation programs are the mechanism for
providing aid to victims ofterrorism; thus, for the first time, victims are defined
based on their residence in a particular state rather than on their status as
American citizens. 8s

10

I'

See 22 U.S.C. § 550] note (]994) (Findings).
See Carolyn Skomeck, Senate OK's Anti-Te"orism Bill, CHI. SUN-TiMES, Apr. 18, 1996,

at ]6.
Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (]]O Stat.) ]214-]3]9
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S. C.).
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 1060]-10608 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
... See id. § 10603b(b)(Supp. V 1999).
•, See id. § 10603b(a)-(b).
12
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Crime Victims Fund Modifications

One of the new laws in the Antiterrorism Act was a modification to the
Crime Victims Fund to allow reserve funds to be set aside to make
supplemental grants to help provide assistance to victims of the Murrah
Federal Building bombing, to enable victims to participate in trial proceedings
arising from the bombing, and for other related expenses. 86

b. Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act
Another section of the Antiterrorism Act was an amendment to be cited
as the Justice for Victims ofTerrorism Act of 1996.87 The Justice for Victims
of Terrorism Act creates two categories of victims: (1) victims of terrorism
outside the United States,88 and (2) victims of terrorism within the United
States. 89
With regard to an act ofterrorism occurring outside the United States,
The Director may make supplemental grants . . . to States to provide
compensation and assistance to residents of such States who, while outside
of the territorial boundaries of the United States, are victims ofa terrorist act
and are not persons eligible for compensation under title VIII of the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.90

Thus, this provision is meant to supplement the Omnibus Act.
With regard to acts of terrorism occurring within the United States, §
10603b(b), titled "Victims ofTerrorism within the United States," provides that,
the Director may make supplemental grants as provided in section
10603(d)(4)(8) ofthis title to States for eligible crime victim compensation and
assistance programs to provide emergency relief, including crisis response
efforts, assistance, training, and technical assistance, for the benefit of

16 See id. § 10601 (d)(5)( 1994). In 1999, presumably because the Murrah Federal Building
bombing trial ended, Congress amended this section again, striking out the specific directives on
compensating Murrah Federal Building victims. See id. § 10601 note (Supp. V 1999)
(Amendments).
17 See id. § 10603b (Supp. V 1999).
uSee id. § 10603b(a).
19 See id. § 10603b(b).
90 Id. § 10603b(a).
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victims of terrorist acts or mass violence occurring within the United States
and may provide funding to United States Attorney's Offices for use in
coordination with State victim compensation and assistance efforts in
providing emergency relief. 9 )

Thus, this amendment also addresses an important loophole in the Omnibus
Act, the lack of immediate crisis response. Crisis response was an area for
which the Flight 103 survivors castigated the United States government. That
criticism was not lost on Congress. After the bombing ofthe Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, Congress recognized a need for similar responses
within the United States. The supplemental grants from this fund to eligible
programs are earmarked to provide emergency relief, including, among other
things, crisis response efforts.92 One ofthe specific provisions was for "crisis
response efforts, assistance, training, and technical assistance, for the benefit
of victims ...."93 The tragedies in Lockerbie and Oklahoma City triggered
passage of laws providing for immediate crisis response efforts.
In conclusion, under these compensation laws, victims receive aid from the
State. From a torts perspective, the State fulfills its obligation to care for its
members by making them whole when they are injured. From a contracts
perspective, the State helps citizens regain the status quo when a terrorist
event breaches the societal contract of a safe environment. The aid in the
earlier laws went only to United States citizens. The aid in later laws
responding to acts of terrorism within the United States is not restricted only
to citizens.
B.

Restitution-Type Statutes

Congress has codified a restitution approach for terrorist victims in laws
that enable victims or survivors to bring suit themselves.
1. Federal Courts Administration Act

Congress enabled victims to sue directly by creating the Federal Courts
Administrative Act of 1992,94 an addition to the Omnibus Act. While terrorism

9)

92
93
94

[d. § 10603b(b).
See id.
[d.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339B (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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is generally discussed as a criminal activity in this Title, the Federal Courts
Administration Act of 1992 created "a civil cause ofaction in Federal court for
victims of terrorism"95 that makes it possible for injured citizens or their
families to sue terrorists directly in United States federal courts. The statute
assumes that the terrorist act occurs abroad. The statute applies to "any
national of the United States.'>9Ii
The statute enables victims or their survivors to sue perpetrators directly
by creating a cause of action and a jurisdiction that victims lacked before.
According to the Senate report, this provision was designed to "allow the law
to catch up with contemporary reality by providing victims ofterrorism with a
remedy for a wrong that, by its nature, falls outside the usual jurisdictional
categories of wrongs that national legal systems have traditionally
addressed. '>97
The civil remedy section provides that:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or
business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate,
survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the
United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and
the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees. 98

"International terrorism" is defined to mean activities that
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or
of any State;

(B) appear to be intended(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian popUlation;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or

Id. § 2333 (1994).
Id. "[f]he term 'National of the United States' has the meaning given such term in
section 101 (a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act." Id. § 2331 (2). See infra notes 126
& 175 and their accompanying text.
97 S. REp. NO. 102-342, pt. III, at 22 (1992).
91 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1994).
9S
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(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or
kidnapping; and

(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.99

By defining as crimes violent extraterritorial acts that would be crimes if
they were committed in the United States, Congress has made it possible for
federal courts to reach acts that previously escaped the net of United States
jurisdiction. 100

2. Exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Congress not only enabled victims to sue perpetrators directly. Victims
can now sue foreign governments that sponsor terrorism. This new right
comes from a 1996 exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976. 101 A foreign state is generally immune from suit by other states. 102
However, growing anger in Congress at federal courts' refusal to find
jurisdiction in cases such as Pan Am 103103 led to passage, as part of the
Antiterrorism Act, ofan exception to this jurisdictional immunity .104 The 1996
terrorism exception is:

Id. §2331(1)(A)-(C).
The principle seems to be that of universal jurisdiction, which allows "a state to prescribe
its laws over a class of criminal offenses recognized as being of 'universal concem, regardless
of the situs of the offense and the nationalities of the offender and the offended .... Brandon S.
Chabner, The Omnibus Diplomatic Security And Antiterrorism Act of 1986: Prescribing and
Enforcing United States Law Against Terrorrist Violence Overseas, 37 UCLAL. REv. 985, 998
(1990) (quoting Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX.
L. REv. 785, 788 (1988». See also Flatow v. The Islamic Republic ofiran, 999 F. Supp. I, 15
n.7 (D.D.C. 1998) (suggesting three bases on which "extraterritorial application of the state
sponsored terrorism exceptions is consistent with international law.").
101 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994& Supp. V 1999). The exception is at § 1605(a)(7)
(Supp. V 1999).
101 "Until the beginning of this century, the United States afforded foreign states absolute
immunity from suit in courts of the United States as a matter of common law." Flatow, 999 F.
Supp. at 11 (citing Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). Statutory law also
recognized this precept. See. e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2) (1994).
103 Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 13.
104 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605 & 1610 (Supp. V. 1999).
99

100

2001]

VICTIMS OF TERRORIST A TI'A CKS

101

(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case---{7) ... in which money damages
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was
caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage
taking, or the provision of material support or resources . . . for such an act
if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official,
employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his
or her office, employment, or agency .... 105

This amendment to the Antiterrorism Act penetrates the shield of sovereign
immunity behind which government sponsors ofterrorism could hide. Once
the shield of sovereign immunity is down, a second amendment, the Civil
Liability for Acts of State-Sponsored Terrorism Act,l06 enables victims to bring
private lawsuits against the officials, employees, or agents ofthat state sponsor
ofterrorism.
In all of these laws, victims are defined as American nationals. 107 Under
these laws, injured victims or survivors now have a cause of action in federal
court against individual foreign terrorists, against foreign governments that
sponsor terrorism, and against employees or agents ofthose governments who
themselves committed terrorist acts. Congress hoped that suits under these
provisions would affect not only the specific individuals charged with acts of
terrorism but also the states or entities that fund them. According to the
Senate report accompanying the bill for the Federal Courts Administration Act,
"[b]y its provisions for compensatory damages, tremble [sic] damages, and the
imposition ofliability at any point along the causal chain ofterrorism, it would

[d. § 1605(a)(7).
106 See id. § 1605 note (Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism). This
amendment provides:
105

an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism designated under section 60) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [50
App. U.S.C. 24050)) while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment,
or agency shall be liable to a United States national or the national's legal
representative for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee,
or agent for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under
section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, for money damages which may
include economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, and punitive damages ifthe
acts were among those described in section 1605(a)(7).
101 E.g., Signing Statement by President George H. Bush Upon Signing S. 1569, Pub. L. No.
102-572 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3942.
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interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow ofmoney ."108 President George H. Bush
was "pleased that the bill explicitly authorizes an American national to file suit
in the United States for the recovery of treble damages against the
perpetrators of international terrorism. This will ensure that, if needed, a
remedy will be available for Americans injured abroad by senseless acts of
terrorism. "109 These laws embody the restitution concept that victims should
be able to seek redress from their attackers regardless of other aid the
government may provide. I 10
V. ARGUMENT FOR A BROADER DEFINITION OF VICTIM

Victims of terrorism are not always treated the same in the aftermath of
a terrorist attack. A person injured in an airline bombing abroad will be treated
differently than his neighbor injured in a car bombing in the United States.
Initially, the only victims who received aid under a terrorism response statute
were American citizens or resident aliens injured, captured, or killed while
working for the American government overseas. I I I As terrorism has become
more widespread against American symbols overseas and at home, our laws
responding to terrorism must recognize the need to provide aid to a larger
category of victims. Relief provisions should help the injured, not create
disparate treatment of victims. The goal of the aid sections of our terrorism
legislation should be to treat similarly harmed victims similarly. To treat victims
similarly, victims should be defined as broadly as possible.

S. REP. NO. 102-342, at 22 (1992).
109 Signing Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 1569, supra note 106.
110 Psychological satisfaction flowing from the opportunity to have one's day in court might
be a benefit of this restitution approach. But see Henderson, supra note 19, at 953-66
(discussing the impact of core crime on victims).
III See 5 U .S.C. § SS69( a)( 1)(B)( 1994) (covering citizens, nationals, or resident aliens); see
also discussion supra Part IV.A.l.
101
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Each new terrorism law is designed to fit a particular circu~stance. 112
Thus, the statute's remedies may be specific to that episode. 113 Hopefully, the
later law fills gaps in earlier laws. For example, no provisions existed to help
victims' families who traveled to Lockerbie, Scotland. Responding to that lack
ofaid, in later legislation, Congress included a policy providing a variety ofaid
onsite. Similarly, victims are generally defined on an ad hoc basis as Congress
reacts with legislation in response to a terrorist act. The legislation reflects the
event that precipitated it, so the definitions fit the event. But once the category
has been created, it continues to exist in the statute. Ifit is too specific, it may
exclude people who fall victim in a later terrorist event.
Terrorism response statutes employ a host of terms to describe those to
whom the statutes are intended to apply. For example, our statutes apply
variously to "citizens," "resident aliens," "nationals,""Americans," "American
victims," "United States citizens," "injured citizens" or "any national ofthe
United States." Historically, it may have made sense to limit aid to United
States citizens when terrorism was something that occurred abroad,
infrequently, and against such obvious symbols of American society as
embassies and consulates. Today, however, the existence of multiple terms
to identify who is eligible for relief under the various statutes could cause
victims who suffer similar harms to be treated differently. Providing aid for
a broader category of victims than "citizens" is a starting place; our society
is composed of many who "oweO ... allegiance to the United States" I 14 and
who deserve protection from the United States when they are the victims of
attacks against the United States. Defining victims more broadly comports
with the historical trend in the statutes to cover more situations and more
victims. It sharpens a growing awareness of the need to respond with

112 These laws are similar to "the government's security procedures ... based upon terrorist
threats, which makes them, by their very definition, reactive rather than proactive." McQuade,
supra note 78, at 352 and accompanying text (paraphrasing comments of the assistant
administrator of Aviation Standards for the Federal Aviation Administration, reported in Pan

Am Flight 103: Hearings 0/ the Narcotics. Te"orism and International Operations
Subcommittee o/the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., Apr. 7, 1989).
113 See Chabner, supra note 99, at 1000 (pointing out that "the biggest obstacle to a universal
prohibition of terrorism is the international community's inability to define the term
adequately.") (citing Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations of the United States § 404
(comment a) (1987». Ifthere can beno universal agreement ofwhat terrorism is, our lawmakers
can hardly be expected to do more than try to keep up as new types of terrorist acts occur.
114 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1994).
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flexibility to treat victims with dignity and to assist and compensate them. It
makes our statutes consonant with each other. Finally, it prevents unfair
results.

A.

Defining Victims Based on Residence Rather Than Citizenship
Comports with the Historical Trend in the Statutes to Cover
More Situations and to Aid More Victims.

The first terrorism laws to provide aid to victims were passed in response
to terrorism directed at American targets abroad. These earlier laws define
victims differently depending on where the terrorist event occurs. Victims
injured abroad are eligible for different types and levels of aid than those
harmed within the United States. Terrorist acts abroad targeted against
Americans trigger definitions ofvictims that focus on citizenship. The Victims
of Terrorism Compensation Act, II' part of the Omnibus Act,116 is narrowly
designed to aid civil servants or citizens, nationals, or resident aliens ofthe
United States who are rendering personal service to the United States and who
are taken captive as a result of their relationship with the United States
government.1I7 The law is compensatory in nature. Captives were to be
compensated not only on their own behalf but on the nation's. Just as the
terrorism was aimed at symbols of American society, the captives were
compensated at least partly as symbols ofthe nation. Their symbolic status
grew directly out of their employment with the United States government.
While the statute allows compensation to "nationals" or "resident aliens," this
category of victims is very narrow, limited only to those nationals or resident
aliens who were rendering personal service to the United States.
The legislation passed in response to the Lockerbie bombing similarly
provided aid only for those victims who were United States citizens. Again,
the compensatory nature of the statute highlights the focus on aiding only
United States citizens. This focus stems directly from Congress' perception
at the time that terrorism was an international, not a national, problem. In
response to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, Congress amended Title 22,
"Foreign Relations and Intercourse," of the United States Code by adding a
chapter entitled "United States Response to Terrorism Affecting Americans

lIS Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 801-805 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 853,
879 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
116 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
m See 5 U.S.C. § 5569(a)(I)(B) (1994).
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Abroad."118 Dealing with aviation security, this chapter provides policy
statements and guidelines for the Department of State to follow in dealing with
victims of international disasters, particularly aviation disasters. A pervasive
concept in this foreign relations chapter is that ofcitizenship. In promulgating
the policy statements, Congress found that ''the United States Government has
a special obligation to United States victims of acts of terrorism directed
against this Nation and should provide prompt assistance to the families ofsuch
victims and assure that fair and prompt compensation is provided to such
victims and their families. "119 The term "United States victims" is not defined
in the policy statements. However, the very first policy statement announces
that "[i]t is the policy of the Department of State pursuant to section 2715 of
this title to directly and promptly notify the families of victims of aviation
disasters abroad concerning citizens ofthe United States directly affected by
such a disaster, including timely written notice. "120 This phrase or something
similar appears nine more times in the twelve policy statements. Since the
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 was so blatantly targeted at an American
airliner bringing American college students home for the holidays, it is
understandable that the legislation passed in the aftermath ofthe event would
focus on aiding American citizens.
However, as terrorism has come home, the trend is toward aiding a
broader group of victims. Terrorist events that have occurred within the
United States generally trigger restitution-type statutes in which the definition
of''victim'' is based on residence rather than on citizenship. Legislation passed
after the Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City did not focus on
the citizenship of the victims. Legislation arising from the Murrah Federal
Building bombing shows that Congress was concerned with aiding everyone
hurt by this act ofdomestic terrorism rather than with making aid available only
to citizens. The legislation's positioning in Title 42 ofthe Code, which deals
with the public health and welfare, reflects the focus on aiding crime victims
that characterizes this chapter. 121 After the bombing, Congress amended the
Victim Compensation and Assistance section of Title 42 to create the Justice

22 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5513 (1994).
119 [d. § 5501 note (Congressional Findings).
120 22 U.S.C. § 5503(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
121 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10607 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Such focus is iJlustrated by the
titles of various sections: § 10601, "Crime Victims Fund;" § 10602, "Crime victim
compensation;" § 10603, "Crime victim assistance;" § 10605, "Establishment of Office for
Victims of Crime;" § 10606, "Victims' Rights," dealing with rights of crime victims; § 10607,
"Services to victims," dealing with crime victims.
III
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for Victims of Terrorism Act of 1996. 122 Desire to help the Oklahoma City
victims prompted this law, but the law goes further than those specific victims.
The Act's purpose is to expand crime victims' compensation programs to
cover injuries suffered by terrorism victims. As with crime victim
compensation programs generally, those who could be compensated under
these amendments merely had to qualify for compensation under eligible state
crime victim compensation programs.123 They did not need to demonstrate
United States citizenship. Compensation in this statute stems from sustaining
an injury on United States soil rather than from being a United States citizen.
Providing aid to United States residents instead of limiting it to citizens is
appropriate because it recognizes that those victimized may owe allegiance to
this country even if they are not citizens. 124
Rather than considering the victims of the Murrah Federal Building
bombing in Oklahoma City to be victims of crime, they are considered to be
victims of terrorism. This is a new development in American law.
Amendments to sections of Title 42 dealing with victim compensation and
assistance are to be cited as the "Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of
1996.'>I2S Originally § 10601 ofthe Justice for Victims ofTerrorism Act, the
Crime Victims Fund,126 was intended to subsidize state victim assistance
programs. After the Murrah Federal Building was bombed, a new section was
incorporated into § 10601, which provided:
The Director may set aside up to $500,000 of the reserve fund described in
paragraph (4) to make supplemental grants to United States Attorneys Offices
to provide necessary assistance to victims of the bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to facilitate observation ofandlor
participation by such victims in trial proceedings arising therefrom, including,
without limitation, provision of lodging and travel assistance, and to pay
such other, related expenses determined to be necessary by the Director. 127

122 Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 231-236 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.)
1214,1243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1999»; 42 U.S.C. § 10601 note (Supp.
V I 999)(Short Title ofl996 Amendment states: "This subtitle [... enacting sections 10603b and
10608 of this title, amending this section and sections 10602 and 10603 of this title, and
enacting provisions set out as notes under section 10602 of this title] may be cited as the
•Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 1996. "').
123 See 42 U.S.C. § 10603b(b) (Supp. V 1999).
124 See 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(22) (1994).
12' 42 U.S.C. § 10601 note (Supp. V 1999) (Short Title of 1996 Amendments).
126 42 U.S.C. § 10601(a)-(g) (1994).
127 42 U.S.C. § 10601 note (Supp. V 1999)(Amendments)(explaining that the paragraph has
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Section 10602 was also amended in response to the Murrah Federal Building
attack. Originally, Section 10602, "Crime victim compensation," provided that
the director of the Crime Victim Fund could make grants to eligible crime
victim compensation programs. 128 Eligible crime victim compensation
programs were those operated by states and offering "compensation to victims
and survivors of victims of criminal violence, including drunk driving and
domestic violence."'29 Ifa compensable crime occurred within the state, the
program would have to compensate victims who were non-residents of the
state using the same criteria that it would use to compensate victims who were
residents of the state. 130 The program would have to compensate victims of
federal crimes that occurred within the state "on the same basis that such
program provides compensation to victims of State crimes."'31 The program
would compensate residents ofthe state who were victims ofcrimes occurring
outside the state if the crimes would have been compensable had they
occurred within the state l32 and if the places where the crimes occurred did
not have eligible victim compensation programs themselves. '33
The amendments to § 10602 reflect Congress' interest in providing aid to
terrorism victims. Subsection (b)(6) now compensates
residents of the State who are victims of crimes occurring outside the State
if- ... (B) the places the crimes occurred in are outside of the United States
(if the compensable crime is terrorism, as defined in section 2331 of title 18)
or are States not having eligible crime victim compensation programs. 134

Originally, § 10602(d) defined "compensable crime" as "a crime the victims
of which are eligible for compensation under the eligible crime victim
compensation program, and includes driving while intoxicated and domestic

been struck from the statute).
121 See 42 U.S.C. § 10602(a)(l)(1994)(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 10602 (1994 & Supp.
V 1999».
129 Id. § 10602(b)(1).
130 See id. § 10602(b)(4).
131 [d. § 10602(b)(5).
132 See id. § 10602(b)(6)(A).
133 See id. § 10602(b)(6)(B).
134 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(6)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
10602(b)(6)(B) (1994».
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violence."13S The amendment reads:
(3) the term "compensable crime" means a crime the victims of which are
eligible for compensation under the eligible crime victim compensation
program, and includes crimes, whose victims suffer death or personal injury,
that are described in section 247 of title 18, crimes involving terrorism,
driving while intoxicated, and domestic violence. 136

Thus, under this law, to receive aid, one must be a victim ofa compensable
crime, and compensable crimes include terrorism.
The new amendment also includes a benefit to crime victims that did not
exist under the original law. At § 10602(c), "[e]xclusion from income for
purposes of means tests," if a victim wants to apply for federal, state, or local
government programs that use federal funds, provide medical, or other
assistance, the victim may exclude from income the crime victim compensation
that he received through crime victim compensation programs until ''the total
amount of assistance that the applicant receives from all such programs is
sufficient to fully compensate the applicant for losses suffered as a result of
the crime."l37 The purpose of this Section is to keep a victim from seeming
to have an income level that would exclude him from consideration for
assistance.
An important concept in the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act is that
of "resident" of a state. If a compensable crime occurs within a state, victims
who are residents of the state and victims who are nonresidents of the state
receive compensation awards based on the same criteria. 138 Eligible programs
provide compensation to residents ofthe state for crimes occurring outside the
state if the crime would have been compensable in the state and it occurred
outside of the United States if it was terrorism,139 or it occurred in states
without compensation programs.l40 "Resident" is not defined in the original
Section or in the supplement. 141 Use of the tenn "resident" rather than
"citizen" suggests that the sweep of the statute is broad. Remarks of Senator

m 42 U.S.C. § 10602(d)(3)(1994)(amendedby 42 U.S.C. § 10602(d)(3)(Supp. V 1999».
136 42 U.S.C. § 10602 (d)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
137 Id. § I0602(c).
131 See 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(4) (1994).
139 See id. § 10602(b)(6)(A).
140 See id. § I0602(b){6){B).
141 See 42 U.S.C. § 10602(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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Patrick Leahy, who suggested the changes to § 112,142 indicate that "resident"
should be interpreted broadly. Speaking specifically of the Oklahoma City
bombing, he said,
[w]e can do more to see that victims of crime, including terrorism, are treated
with dignity and assisted and compensated with government help ... Section
112 of the substitute . . . includes a proposal I made to increase the
availability of assistance to victims of terrorism and mass violence here at
home . . .. [T]he substitute includes provisions to make funds available
through supplemental grants to the States to assist and compensate our
neighbors who are victims of terrorism and mass violence, which incidents
might otherwise overwhelm the resources of a State's crime victims
compensation program or its victims assistance services. 143

He further said,
[t]he substitute (bill) will also fill a gap in our law for residents of the United
States who are victims of terrorism and mass violence that occur outside the
borders of the United States. Those who are not in the military, civil service
or civilians in the service of the United States are not eligible for benefits in
accordance with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986. One of the continuing tragedies of the downing of Pan Am flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland, is that the U.S. Government had no authority to
provide assistance or compensation to the victims of that heinous crime.
Likewise, the us. victims of the Achille Lauro incident could not be given
aid. This was wrong and should be remedied. l44

In these remarks, "residents of the United States" and "U.S. victims"
should be seen as synonyms and should be interpreted as applying to
"residents" broadly rather than to "citizens" specifically. If"U.S. victims"
were read to mean "U.S. citizens," these remarks could suggest that victims
of domestic acts of terrorism may receive compensation from the state in
which the act occurred if they are residents of a state, but they cannot receive
compensation for injuries sustained in terrorist acts abroad unless they are
United States citizens. Interpreting "resident" as different from "citizen"
dramatically changes the effect of the statute. Under this interpretation, the

See S. REp. No. 104-179 (1996), reprinted in 1996 V.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 937. The report
is related to passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
143 ld. at 940 (emphasis added).
144 [d. at 941 (emphasis added).
142
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statute would not effectuate its intended purpose, to offer compensation to a
wider group of people.
This Section broadens protection for crime victims to include terrorist
events. Throughout the Section, the victims whose rights are being expanded
are described as "residents" of a state. Although the statute does not define
"resident," in keeping with the historical trend ofexpanding protection to fit the
greatest number ofcircumstances, it should be broadly interpreted to cover the
greatest number of potential victims.

B. Broadly Interpreting "Victims" Under Our Terrorism Response
Laws Addresses the Need to be Flexible in Our Approach to Aiding
Victims.
In commenting on the Antiterrorism Act, Senator Leahy said,
lilt is my hope that through this substitute [improvements to the Victims of
Crime Act, Section 112] we will proceed to enact a series of improvements in
our growing body oflaw recognizing the rights and needs of victims of crime.
We can do more to see that victims of crime, including terrorism, are treated
with dignity and assisted and compensated with government help.143

Leahy noted that Americans' "sense of security has been shaken by the
bombing in Oklahoma City, the destruction atthe World Trade Center in New
York, and recent assaults upon the White House."146 He therefore proposed
allowing "additional flexibility in targeting resources to victims ofterrorism and
mass violence and the trauma and devastation that they cause."147 Specific
provisions such as "crisis response efforts, assistance, training, and technical
assistance, for the benefit of victims"148 demonstrate a broad range of aid
calling for a flexible approach. Under a flexible approach, status as limited as
"citizens" should not determine who is eligible for aid.

14'
146
147
148

S. REp. No. 104-179 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 940.
ld.
ld.
ld.
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C. A Broad Reading of "Victims" Helps Ensure Consistency in Our
Terrorism Response Laws.
The earlier Omnibus Act applies primarily to those in service to the United
States, and the policy statements adopted after Pan Am 103 only apply to
American citizens. Reading the Justice for Victims ofTerrorism Act to apply
to the broadest category of victims promotes a flexible approach to aiding
victims. Bringing coverage to a broader group ofvictims fits the growing trend
in our terrorism response laws. Defining victims broadly under the Justice for
Victims of Terrorism Act makes it consistent with other recent terrorism
response laws, notably the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 and the
terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), both
of which cover American nationals.
We should define victims broadly to ensure that those who qualify for
federal benefits even if they are not citizens or nationals will be eligible for
terrorism benefits should they become victims. In only the second case to
apply the FSIA,149 the Flatow v. Islamic Republic ofIran court emphasized
the need to create national standards in dealing with legal issues raised by
terrorism.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the FSIA "codifies the standards
governing foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of substantive federal
law" and that its application will "generally require interpretation of numerous
points of federal law." ... Subsequently, Congress created jurisdiction and
federal causes of action for personal injury or death resulting from statesponsored terrorism, including its own statute of limitations. These actions
indicate Congressional intent that the federal courts create coherent national
standards to support this initiative of national significance. ISO

For the creation of"coherent national standards" that will apply in all terrorism
cases, the interpretation of "victim" should be broad.
The Justice for Victims ofTerrorism Act and the other earlier federal laws
passed in response to acts of terrorism were compensation-type statutes.

149 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998). In 1995, twentyyear-old college student Alisa Flatow, spending a junior semester abroad in Israel, was killed
when an Islamic Jihad suicide truck bomb blew up the bus she was riding in. Her father brought
a wrongful death action against Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.
ISO [d. at 15 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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More recent laws continue to be primarily compensatory but also include
restitution provisions. Some opponents ofrestitution for crime victims believe
that there is no rationale for treating crime victims as more "special"151 than
victims oftortfeasors or governmental actors. However, regardless of how
society regards crime victims, victims of terrorism should be seen as special
since they are targeted not as individuals but as symbolic representatives of
governrnent. 152 In the criminal law context, victims generally claim restitution
from their attackers as part of the sentencing that follows a criminal trial. 153
However, in many terrorism episodes, there will never be a criminal trial.
Restitution statutes open a way for terrorism victims to seek redress directly,
by suing the perpetrators l54 or by suing the state that sponsored the
perpetrators. 155 The restitution remedy is separate from whatever measures
the federal government may pursue.
The terrorism victim sets restitution in motion by filing a civil suit in federal
district court.156 As part of the Omnibus Act, Congress created the Federal
Courts Administration Act, 157 which established the right to sue individual
terrorists in civil court for terrorism injuries. Those allowed to sue are
"nationals of the United States."158 ''National'' is defined in Title 8 as either
a citizen or one who owes permanent allegiance to the United States. 159 This
definition ofvictim is rightly broader than the definitions in the Omnibus Act
or the policy statements promulgated after the bombing of Pan Am Flight

Henderson, supra note 19, at 1017.
U2 See Jennifer A. Rosenfeld, The Antite"orism Act 0/1990: Bringing 1nternational
Terrorists to Justice the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 726, 737 n.37
(1992) (paraphrasing statement of Senator Chuck Grassley as follows: "Those who were killed
died because they were Americans and, thus, it is Americans who should be able to send a
world-wide message that their legal system will not tolerate such acts of terrorism." The
senator's remarks are found at Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Subcomm. of Courts and
Administrative Practice, Senate Judiciary Comm., lOlst Cong., 5-6 (1990».
153 See, e.g., restitution statutes such as ALA. CODE §§ 15-18-65 through 15-18-78 (1995)
(Alabama); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.045 (Michie 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4301 (1999)
(Kansas); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.11 (West 1997).
U4 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), an addition to the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorist Act of 1986, creating a civil remedy section under which nationals
of the United States injured in terrorist attacks could sue the perpetrators directly in federal
court. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
m See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(Supp. V 1999).
•'6 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (1994).
m Seeid
.,. ld.
•'9 8 U.S.C. § llOl(a)(22) (1994).
UI

2001]

VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS

113

103. 160 However, since individual perpetrators will rarely be identifiable, it
may be a moot point that a broader category ofvictims is theoretically enabled
to seek restitution. A more useful law for victims and their survivors is the
1996 restitution provision known as the terrorism exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities ACt. 161 The terrorism exception is ajurisdictional statute
allowing terrorism victims to sue, in United States federal district court, foreign
states that sponsor terrorism. 162
The victim of a terrorist attack traditionally had little or no such direct
recourse. He could not sue the perpetrator for committing a crime because
the State must bring suit against those who commit crimes. He generally could
not sue for damages in a civil court because the jurisdiction of such courts was
limited. 163 He could not sue a government, assuming he could posit

See supra argument Part IV.A.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. V 1999).
162 Victims or their survivors are beginning to sue under this law. The first lawsuit against
a foreign state sponsor of terrorism was an action brought by the families of the pilots known
as Brothers to the Rescue, whose two unarmed civilian planes were shot down over the Straits
of Florida by the Cuban Air Force on February 24, 1996. See Alejandre v. The Republic of
Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) [hereinafter "Alejandre 1'']. Both the Cuban
government and the Cuban Air Force were named as defendants. Although neither defendant
entered an appearance, under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994), which prohibits default judgments
without satisfactory evidence, "the district court conducted a trial in order to determine whether
the plaintiffs had satisfactory evidence to support their claims." Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga
Distancia De Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999) (vacating a judgment that the
plaintiffs could collect a portion of their damages by garnishing certain companies' debts to the
Cuban government). The Alejandre I court found that "the defendants were not immune from
the plaintiffs' suits because the Cuban Air Force (as an agent of the terrorist-sponsoring Cuban
Government) had committed an act of extrajudicial killing by shooting down the airplanes. See
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. II 1996). Alejandre I, 996 F. Supp. at 1247-48." Id. at 1279.
160

161

The second case to be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. V 1999) was Flatow
v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998). See supra note 152 and
accompanying text.
163 In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984), ajJ'g per
curiam, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), where victims sought compensatory and punitive
damages, the court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On March II, 1978,
members of the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") seized a car, a taxi, and two buses,
taking hostages and killing Israeli, Dutch, and American citizens. See id. at 776. The victims'
estates sued in United States federal court, asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28
U. s. C. § 13 31, diversity jurisdiction under § 1332, and jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. See id. at 775. One of the judges found a jurisdictional basis for the alien
plaintiffs under the Alien Tort Statute but held that they were barred from bringing suit because
they were injured by private citizens who were acting as terrorists. The other two members of
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government negligence or even complicity, because governments were
protected by sovereign immunity.l64 In a few instances he may be able to sue
a third party. In the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland
in 1989, victims' families sued Pan Am for negligence in not carrying out
mandated security procedures that could have prevented the bomb from being
loaded onto the plane. 16S In general, however, without a specific congressional
grant of authority, victims had no cause of action on which to sue for
terrorism-related injuries and could play no direct role in their recovery from
the terrorist event. Allowing a terrorist victim to sue is a break from traditional
concepts of jurisdiction and immunity.
Allowing terrorism victims to sue in federal court through the terrorism
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act establishes jurisdiction in
United States courts for acts of terrorism sponsored by foreign states. The
provision does not spell out who may bring the law suit. The critical language
is "money damages are sought ... for personal injury or death ...."166 The
exception does not limit the seeking of money damages to victims who are
United States citizens. The provision should be read to apply to the broadest
group ofplaintiffs. This is because "[t]he state sponsored terrorism exception
... provides an express jurisdictional nexus based upon the victim's United
States nationality."167 This jurisdictional nexus is found in the second of the

the panel found other reasons not to grant jurisdiction, including a floodgate argument that
courts could be inundated by such suits.
In 1985, terrorists claiming PLO connections high-jacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro.
Passenger Leon Klinghoffer was shot in his wheelchair as he sat on the ship's deck, then thrown
into the sea His daughters brought suit in federal court, under state law, maritime law, and the
Death on the High Seas Act. See Klinghoffer v. PLO, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
vacated, 937 F.2d. 44 (2d Cir. 1991). The PLO moved to dismiss on the ground that it was
immune from suit The district court denied the motion, and the PLO appealed. See Klinghoffer
v. PLO, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that
the PLO was not immune from suit because it was not a sovereign state, and only sovereign
states were immune from suit under the version of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act then
in force, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). See id. at 46. Although the
Klinghoffers could sue the PLO, difficult questions of process and long-arm jurisdiction
remained for the district court to deal with on remand. The terrorism exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, see discussion supra Part IV.B.2, eliminates these problems.
164 See supra note 167.
16' See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988,37 F .3d 804 (2d Cir.
1994).
166 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1999).
167 Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 22.
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two exceptions to the terrorism exception. The first exception to the terrorism
exception is that a foreign state cannot be sued for terrorism if it was not a
state sponsor ofterrorism at the time ofthe act or did not become one because
of the act for which it is being sued. 168 The second exception is that a foreign
state cannot be sued for terrorism
even if the foreign state is or was so designated, if-{i} the act occurred in
the foreign state against which the claim has been brought and the claimant
has not afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the
claim in accordance with accepted international rules of arbitration; or (ii)
neither the claimant nor the victim was a national of the United States (as that
term is defined in section 10 1(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act}
when the act upon which the claim is based occurred. 169

In other words, either the plaintiff or the victim must be a "national of the
United States."
"National of the United States" is defined in the Immigration and
Nationality Act as "(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who,
though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the
United States." 170 Thus, the jurisdictional nexus required to recover under this
provision is to owe allegiance to the United States.
States such as Iraq could argue that enlarging the definition to include
permanent residents and others, such as refugees, would abrogate ''the
minimum contacts requirement of due process necessary for the assertion of
personaljurisdiction."17l In the narrower case of United States citizens, Iraq
made this argument in DaUbert; v. Republic of Iraq. In DaUbert;, four
United States citizens who were doing business in Kuwait were kidnapped or
otherwise forced into Iraq, where they were imprisoned and tortured. 172 They
and their wives sued the government of Iraq under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. Iraq moved to dismiss for lack of personal and subject matter
jurisdiction. 173 Iraq argued that the activities for which the victims sued Iraq
occurred outside the United States, so Iraq had "no fair warning that a
particular activity [would] subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign

168
169

170
171
172

173

See 28 U.S.C. § \605(a)(7)(A)(Supp. V \999).
Id. § \605(a)(7)(B)(i) & (ii).
8 U.S.C. § \ 101 (a)(22) (1994).
Daliberti v. Republic ofIraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 52 (D.D.C. 2000).
See id. at 41.
See id. at 40.
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sovereign." 174
In rejecting this argument, the Daliberti court pointed out that Congress
had explicitly considered the requirements ofminimum jurisdictional contacts
and adequate notice laid out in Intemational Shoe Co. v. Washington when
it created the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. m The court explained that
personal jurisdiction could be found if the claim was "one over which the
district courts have original jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] section 1330(a),
meaning a claim for which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity."176
The court pointed out that the provisions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act detailing when a foreign state is not entitled to immunity all require some
connection between the lawsuit and the United States. 177 Thus, the immunity
provisions "prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist before our
courts can exercise personaljurisdiction."178 Further, the statute "satisfies the
due process requirement ofadequate notice by prescribing that proper service
be made."179 The due process inquiry, according to the court, is twofold:
Have states that sponsor terrorism been given adequate warning that terrorist
acts against United States citizens, no matter where they occur, may subject
them to suit in a United States court? Have they been provided with that
"degree of predictability ... that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will
and will not render them liable to suit?,'ISO

The Daliberti court concluded that it was reasonable "that foreign states be
held accountable in the courts of the United States for terrorist actions
perpetrated against U.S. citizens anywhere."181 In support ofthis conclusion,
the court quoted the conclusion from Flatow:
All states are on notice that state sponsorship of terrorism is condemned by

174 Id at 53 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977».
m See DaUberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
176 Id.
In See id at 53.
m [d.
179 Proper service is to be made under 28 U.S.c. § 1608 (1994). See DaUberti, 97 F. Supp.
2d at S3.
liD DaUberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at S3 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,

472 (1985».
II.

Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
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the international community. United States policy towards state sponsors of
terrorists, [sic] has been made abundantly clear since the 1979-1981 hostage
crisis in Tehran and the ensuing suspension of diplomatic relations with and
establishment of international boycotts against foreign state sponsors of
terrorism. Foreign state sponsors of terrorism could not reasonably have
expected that the United States would not respond to attacks on its citizens,
and not undertake measures to prevent similar attacks in the future. In light
of the mounting Congressional frustration at the inability of United States
victims offoreign state abuses to obtain relief from any forum, it is manifest
that Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a){7) to ensure fair play and
substantial justice for American victims of state sponsored terrorism. 112

The Dalibert; and Flotow courts concluded that ''the state-sponsored
terrorism exception 'provides an express jurisdictional nexus based upon the
victim's United States nationality."'1.3
Applying the due process analysis using the proposed broader definition of
victim yields the same result. A person who demonstrates a legal connection
to the United States (through being a permanent resident, a refugee, or a
political asylum seeker) and who brings suit against a terrorist state for
terrorism can demonstrate "some connection" between the lawsuit and the
United States. Indeed, to interpret otherwise could result in depriving the
victim of a forum if he has forsworn other allegiances and now owes
allegiance to the United States.

It would defeat the growing legislative purpose to aid a larger group of
victims, and it would make the statutes' coverage inconsistent, if we read the
Justice for Victims ofTerrorism Act as applying only to citizens while allowing
all who owe allegiance to the United States to seek redress under the terrorism
exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Not only is it necessary to read "victim" broadly to ensure that our
developing terrorism response laws are consistent with one another, "victim"
must also be defined more broadly than "citizen" to be consistent with our
treatment of aliens in other parts of the United States Code. Treatment of
aliens is dealt with in Title VIII of the United States Code, Aliens and
Nationality. Congress announced in § 1601, "Statements of national policy
concerning welfare and immigration," that it is United States immigration policy

182

\83

Id. (quoting Flatow \I. Islamic Republic ofIran, 999 F. Supp. I, 23 (D.D.C. 1998».
Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (quoting Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 22).
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that aliens be self-sufficient to the degree possible}84 However, qualified
aliens are eligible for federal benefits. 18s Qualified aliens are defined in §
1641, and include, among others, those "lawfully admitted for permanent
residence,"186 those "granted asylum,"187 and refugees. l88 Thus, limiting aid
under terrorism response statutes to citizens or nationals would be too
restrictive. Even adding permanent residents to the list ofthose eligible for aid
in a terrorism event would leave out asylum seekers and refugees. In fact,
even those people classified as not qualified aliens, and therefore not eligible
for any federal aid,189 are still eligible for "[s]hort-term, non-cash, in-kind
emergency disaster relief. "190 Thus, to treat victims fairly while ensuring that
each law in our developing system ofterrorism response laws is consistent not
only with the others but also with treatment mandated for non-citizens
elsewhere in the United States Code, "victims" should be broadly defined. 191

D. Reading "Victim" Na"owly Could Lead to Grotesquely Unfair
Situations.
Imagine two neighbors, a citizen and a permanent resident. Both are
injured in a terrorist event in their state. As residents of their state, both
receive compensation for their injuries, and both have the right to sue the
perpetrators. Recovering, they travel to the same conference abroad, where
they both again become victims of a terrorist attack. Narrowly interpreting
"U.S. victims" as "U.S. citizens" would result in compensation for one
neighbor but not for the other. Imagine a third neighbor, a refugee, who was
also injured in the attack within the state. This neighbor received, at most,
disaster relief. Ifhe had made it to the international conference, he would
again have received nothing. Consider the four members of Brothers to the

8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(A)(Supp. V 1999).
In By negative inference from 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (Supp. V 1999) ("An alien who is not a
qualified alien ... is ineligible for any Federal public benefit. ").
186 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(I) (Supp. V 1999).
117 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (b)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
118 See 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (b)(3) (Supp. V 1999). The other categories of qualified aliens are
those paroled into the United States, those whose deportations are being withheld, those granted
conditional entry, and those who are Cuban and Haitian entrants. See 8 U .S.C. § 1641 (b)( 4)-(7)
(Supp. V 1999).
119 See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (Supp. V 1999).
190 8 U.S.C. § 161 I (b)(\)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
191 Non-qualified aliens, for example foreign tourists in the United States, can seek civil
remedies against international terrorists through the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
184
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Rescue, flying in small planes over international waters and looking for rafters
adrift on the sea between Cuba and Florida. The planes are shot down, the
four are killed, and their survivors seek restitution. Three ofthe victims were
United States citizens, and their families ultimately received ajudgment of$187
million. One was a resident. 192 His family received nothing.
VI. PROPOSED DEFINITION OF VICTIMS OF TERRORISM

This kind ofinequitable aid for similar harms is not right and should not be
inevitable. Statutes giving aid to victims ofterrorist attacks should clarify in
their definition sections that the intended recipients of the aid need not be
United States citizens. It is proposed to create a new category entitled "United
States victims," comprising those who owe allegiance to the United States and
ofthose to whom the United States owes protection. This proposed definition
should be added to existing terrorist legislation and should be incorporated in
new legislation.
PROPOSED DEFINITION: UNITED STATES VICTIMS OF TERRORISM

In the context of providing aid to persons injured or killed in terrorist attacks
against the United States, whether the attack occurs at home or abroad, those
persons eligible for aid shall be called United States victims. United States
victims are people who owe allegiance to the United States, such as citizens,
nationals, permanent residents and those lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. United States victims are also people for whom the United States
has responsibility, such as aliens granted asylum, refugees, and other aliens
lawfully in the United States.

VII. CONCLUSION

Defining victims broadly effectuates the developing intent ofour statutes
to aid more terrorism victims rather than fewer. A broad definition of victim
comports with the statutes' underlying compensation and restitution rationales.
In addition, broadening the definition of victims could serve as a deterrent to
state sponsors of terrorism because a broader definition would increase the

192

See Jeff Jacoby, Make Castro A ccountablefor Crimes, THE TIMES UNION, Jan. 14, 1999,

atA13.
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number of claimants. The sense of security that Senator Leahy mentioned 193
must extend to all who live here, not just to citizens. The flexibility in aiding
victims that Senator Leahy desired can best be achieved by interpreting
broadly. Drafters of new legislation must be aware of the trend toward being
more rather than less inclusive in providing aid for victims. Drafters should
define "victim" broadly to ensure that terrorism relieflegislation actually helps
the greatest number of victims. One way to do this is to incorporate the
proposed definition of "United States Victims of Terrorism" into terrorism
legislation. New terrorism laws may be based on the idea of compensating
victims or on the concept ofproviding restitution to victims. They may address
acts of terror perpetrated at home or abroad. Whatever the rationale for the
aid or the locale of the act, our terrorism response laws should not exclude
victims because they are not citizens. Our terrorism response laws should ask
whether an injured victim owes allegiance to the United States or is one for
whom the United States has responsibility. Ifso, the law should provide aid.
Our laws to aid victims should not themselves create more hardship.

193

See supra note 149 and accompanying text.

